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Abstract
In game-theoretic models studying the evolution of cooperation, a common
assumption is that groups are of constant size. Many natural systems, however,
feature variable group sizes that are influenced by the level of cooperation in
the population. Hence, the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma, a variant of the
volunteer’s dilemma, proposes that individuals sequentially join a group up
to the point where the critical number of cooperators required for provision
of the collective good is reached. The objective of this master’s thesis is to
study the effect of a such group formation scheme on the evolutionary dynamics
of social dilemmas in finite populations. Of focal interest are conditions for
natural selection favoring cooperation and for a cooperator having a higher
fixation probability than a defector. A striking result is that larger population
sizes impede cooperation by toughening these very conditions, whereas in the
standard volunteer’s dilemma with constant group size, larger population sizes
promote cooperation.
Kurzfassung
In spieltheoretischen Modellen zur Evolution von Kooperation wird ha¨ufig ange-
nommen, dass Gruppen von konstanter Gro¨ße sind. Allerdings weisen viele
natu¨rliche Systeme variable Gruppengro¨ßen auf, die durch den Kooperations-
grad der Population beeinflusst werden. Daher sieht das Warten-auf-Freiwillige-
Dilemma, eine Variante des Freiwilligendilemmas, vor, dass Individuen sich
nacheinander einer Gruppe anschließen bis die kritische Anzahl an Koopera-
toren, die fu¨r die Bereitstellung des kollektiven Gutes beno¨tigt wird, erreicht
ist. Ziel dieser Masterarbeit ist es, den Effekt eines solchen Formierungsschemas
von Gruppen auf die evolutiona¨re Dynamik von sozialen Dilemmas in endlichen
Populationen zu untersuchen. Von besonderem Interesse sind Bedingungen
dafu¨r, dass natu¨rliche Selektion Kooperation begu¨nstigt, und dafu¨r, dass die
Fixierungswahrscheinlichkeit eines Kooperators ho¨her ist als die eines Defek-
tors. Ein erstaunliches Ergebnis ist, dass gro¨ßere Populationsgro¨ßen durch Ver-
scha¨rfung ebendieser Bedingungen Kooperation hemmen, wohingegen gro¨ßere
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Along with selection and mutation, cooperation represents an essential fuel for
evolutionary progress. It enables the transition from simple to higher organiza-
tional forms, e.g. from genes to genomes, from cells to multicellular organisms,
and from individuals to groups and societies (Nowak, 2006a; Szathma´ry and
Maynard Smith, 1995). However, in the absence of any other assumption, nat-
ural selection opposes cooperation. Hence, there have to be certain mechanism
at work that allow cooperators to outperform defectors (Nowak, 2006b).
Typically, models designed to explore cooperation-enhancing mechanisms are
built on the assumption that individuals interact in groups of constant size, such
that groups are formed by sampling individuals from the population until an
exogenously designated group size is reached (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Powers
and Lehmann, 2016).
This assumption is challenged by Pen˜a et al. (2016) who argue that, in many
natural systems, group formation is intertwined with the level of cooperation
in the population.
An illustrative example is given by bark beetles attacking trees in order to
access the inner bark tissue that serves as their breeding site (Berryman et
al. (1985), Byers (1989) and Raffa (2001) in Pen˜a et al. (2016)). Because of
the host tree’s defense mechanisms, e.g. resin flow, single beetles fail to pierce
through the outer bark. Therefore, they summon other bark beetles by releasing
a pheromone. Newly arrived beetles either contribute to the effort or defect.
Once a critical number of beetles actively attacks the tree by collective tunneling
and inoculating with symbiont fungi, part or all of the tree is killed, enabling
the beetles to reach the inner bark and lay their eggs. The moment the public
good (i.e., access to the inner bark) is provided, the attraction of further beetles
is effectively stopped, since the production of aggregation pheromones requires
certain substances from the tree’s resin.
Further examples include the production of adhesive proteins by social microbes
(Queller et al., 2003), the preparation and burying of carcasses by burying
beetles (Scott, 1998) and the collective hunting by social carnivores (Boza and
Sza´mado´, 2010).
Pen˜a et al. (2016) introduce a model called the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma
that features a group formation scheme in which group members are recruited
sequentially until there is a certain number of cooperators in the group, leading
to variable group sizes.
The proposed model is deterministic, because it assumes an infinite population
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size. When moving to a model with finite population size, stochastic effects
arise that shift the concept of interest from evolutionary stability to fixation,
extinction and maintenance of strategies (Nowak, 2006a; Gokhale and Traulsen,
2014).
This thesis adapts the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma to finite populations. The
main objective is to investigate the effect that the alternative sampling scheme
exerts on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation, when comparing results
with the classical volunteer’s dilemma that features constant group sizes. Means
of investigation are fixation probabilities as well as stationary distributions. In
particular, the following two questions pertaining to fixation probability are
addressed:
(i) When is cooperation favored by selection?
(ii) When is the fixation probability of a cooperator larger than the fixation
probability of a defector?
The structure of the thesis is as follows.
Chapter 2 presents the background and the methods that are made use of.
Specifically, it outlines public goods games, the frequency-dependent Moran
process, and the concept of fixation probabilities as well as of stationary distri-
butions.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the volunteer’s dilemma. Results obtained by Gokhale
and Traulsen (2010) are revisited, and a threshold public goods game is applied
in order to answer the formulated research questions with conditions for the
relation between benefit and cost of the public good. Furthermore, the influence
of different parameters on the stationary distribution is explored numerically.
Chapter 4 introduces the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma for finite populations.
The questions of interest are addressed for general multiplayer games first and
subsequently for a public goods game. Moreover, stationary distributions are
analyzed numerically for different parameter sets.
Chapter 5 summarizes and compares the obtained results and gives an outlook
on possible future projects involving the proposed group formation process.
4
2. Background and methods
The mathematical framework of the present thesis is composed of evolutionary
game dynamics and evolutionary game theory which have arisen from integrat-
ing population dynamical and game theoretical methods in biological contexts
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006a). Such framework aims at un-
derstanding the dynamical process of following situations: Individuals that are
born with fixed strategies engage in games (i.e., interactions) with each other,
providing them a payoff subject to their strategy. These payoffs determine
the individuals’ fitness which in turn affects the spread of the strategies in the
population.
The thesis focuses on social dilemmas in finite populations that are well-mixed,
i.e., encounters between any two individuals are equally likely. This chapter
explains the employed concepts, namely, public goods games, that are used
to investigate social dilemmas, the frequency-dependent Moran process, that
describes the dynamics of the population, and fixation probabilities as well as
stationary distributions, that help to identify evolutionary success of strategies.
2.1. Public goods games
Public goods games are multiplayer games with two strategies. Each player
either cooperates, i.e., contributes to a public good at a personal cost, or defects,
i.e., makes no contribution. The public good is then shared among all players,
allowing the defectors to free ride on the cooperators’ efforts.
The consequence captures the essence of a social dilemma (Dawes, 1980): From
the view point of an individual player, defecting is the better strategy than
cooperating, however, if none or too few of the players cooperate, such that the
public good cannot be produced, everyone is left with nothing.
2.2. The frequency-dependent Moran process
The Moran process is a simple stochastic process that was first proposed by
Moran (1958) and has been widely applied in theoretical biology to model the
dynamics in finite populations. The models in this thesis integrate an extension
of this process: the frequency-dependent Moran process (Nowak et al., 2004).
Consider a well-mixed population of N−1 wild type individuals (here: strategy
to defect) and one mutant type individual (here: strategy to cooperate) that
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is introduced into the population. In each time step, one individual is chosen
to beget a clonal offspring and one individual is chosen to die. The latter is
then being replaced by the offspring of the former. Notably, both choices can
fall on the same individual. Thus, in one time step, the number of mutant type
individuals in the population can either increase by one, decrease by one or stay
the same, whereas the population size is maintained constant throughout the
whole time.
Formally, the frequency-dependent Moran process (Xt)t∈N is a family of random
variables with state space Ω = {0, 1, 2, ..., N}, where Xt describes the number
of mutant type individuals in the population at a given time point t starting
from X0 = 1. The transition probabilities are denoted by
T+m = P (Xt+1 = m+ 1|Xt = m) (2.1)
and
T−m = P (Xt+1 = m− 1|Xt = m) (2.2)
for m ∈ Ω.
With this notation, the probability to remain in the same state is given by
P (Xt+1 = m|Xt = m) = 1− T+m − T−m .
The individual chosen for reproduction is chosen randomly but proportional to
its fitness, whereas the individual chosen for death is chosen randomly. Hence,
the transition probabilities are calculated as
T+m =
m fC











where fC and fD denote the fitness of the cooperators and the defectors, re-
spectively, and also depend on the state of the process, i.e., on m.
Notably, the Moran process has two absorbing states: all wild type individuals
(m = 0) and all mutant type individuals (m = N). Once the population has
reached one of these two states, it will remain in the respective state forever.
The classical approach to modeling fitness is to describe it as a linear combina-
tion of a background fitness (which has value 1) and the payoff,
fC(m) = 1− w + wpiC(m) and fD(m) = 1− w + wpiD(m) (2.5)
(Nowak, 2006a; Traulsen et al., 2008), where parameter w denotes the intensity
of selection and piC as well as piD describe the expected payoff for cooperators
and defectors, respectively, that they obtain from playing the designated game.
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Neutral drift is expressed by w = 0, meaning that an individual’s performance
in the game has no influence on its fitness. Weak selection is given by w  1
and strong selection corresponds to w = 1. Due to the restriction that fC
and fD have to be non-negative for any state m ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}, the selection
intensity w has an upper limit if there are negative payoffs. Therefore, Traulsen
et al. (2008) suggest to define fitness as an exponential function of payoff, so
that
fC(m) = exp(+w piC(m)) and fD(m) = exp(+w piD(m)), (2.6)
which yield fitness values close to zero for negative payoffs and very large fitness
values for positive payoffs. In most cases, the exponential mapping exhibits the
same properties as the linear mapping while being more general by allowing
greater variation in the selection intensity. Consequently, in this thesis, the
fitness of the types is modeled by the exponential functions (2.6).
2.3. Fixation probability
Consider a homogeneous population of individuals of type D (defector). Sup-
pose that during reproduction a rare mutation occurs so that a new type C
(cooperator) is introduced into the population. The dynamics of the Moran
process will lead either to the extinction of the new type or to its invasion such
that, after some time, the population consists of individuals of the mutant type
only. The latter case is called the fixation of the type C, and the probability
for this to happen is called the fixation probability which is denoted by ρC .
In the absence of selection, meaning that the mutation holds neither a fitness
advantage nor a fitness disadvantage, the probability that the mutant becomes
fixed in a population of size N is equal to 1/N (Nowak, 2006a). This is also
referred to as the neutral case. However, in case the fitness of the mutant differs
from that of the wild type, the fixation probability deviates from 1/N .
The probability that a mutant of type C becomes fixed in a population of type











For a detailed derivation, see Traulsen and Hauert (2009).
A Taylor approximation of ρC (given by equation (2.7)) around w = 0 up to
the first order term leads to
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(piC − piD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
. (2.8)
Thus, for weak selection w  1, the fixation probability of type C can be
approximately calculated by this expression. The first term of the right hand
side represents neutral drift, and the second term quantifies the influence of
natural selection. For Γ > 0, the fixation probability is larger than in the
neutral case (w = 0), meaning that type C is favored by selection.
Another interesting question is the comparison of the fixation probability of a
type C individual in a population of Ds with the fixation probability of a type
D individual in a population of Cs. The ratio of the two fixation probabilities
can be calculated by the product over the ratios of the transition probabilities


















It immediately follows that ρC is larger than ρD if and only if Φ > 0 holds.
2.4. Stationary distribution
The fixation probability of a mutant in a wild type population is investigated
under the assumption that mutations are so rare, that the offspring of an in-
dividual is always of the same type as its parent. When assuming that during
each reproduction a mutation, such that the offspring is of the opposite type,
occurs with a certain probability, the process no longer has absorbing states.
Instead, the process can keep changing from state to state in the long run. After
sufficiently long time, however, the probability for the process to be in a certain
state stays the same. These probabilities for all possible states are given by the













for m ∈ {0, 1, ..., N} (Claussen and Traulsen, 2005).
When the mutation rate, i.e., the probability that the offspring of an individual
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(1− µ) (N − i)fD
ifC + (N − i)fD + µ
ifC
ifC + (N − i)fD
]
. (2.12)
This is the symmetric case, where the probability that a cooperator creates a
defecting offspring and the probability that a defector creates a cooperating




This chapter presents the volunteer’s dilemma for finite populations.
Consider a finite well-mixed population of N individuals whose strategy is either
to cooperate or to defect. The composition of the population changes according
to the frequency-dependent Moran process. The transition probabilities of this
process depend on the respective fitness of the two types which in turn depends
on the payoff that the individuals obtain when engaging in an interaction with
each other. Not all the individuals of the population at once, but rather a
selected group of individuals engages in an interaction that brings potential
payoff to the participants.
In the volunteer’s dilemma, interactions take place between individuals in a
group of constant size g. These groups of players are formed by randomly
drawing g individuals from the population. The individuals obtain a payoff
according to the payoff matrix displayed in figure 3.1, i.e., when interacting
with i cooperators, a focal cooperator receives a payoff ci and a focal defector
receives a payoff di.
Number of opposing cooperators 0 1 ... i ... g − 1
cooperator c0 c1 ... ci ... cg−1
defector d0 d1 ... di ... dg−1
Figure 3.1.: Payoff matrix for an evolutionary game in which the payoff depends
on the number of opposing cooperators among the players
The group composition, i.e., the amount of cooperators among the players, can
vary each time a group is formed. The probabilities to obtain certain numbers
of cooperators in a group of size g are given by the probability mass function
of the hypergeometric distribution.






























Chapter 3. Volunteer’s dilemma
(Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010).
3.1. Results for general multiplayer games
In the case of weak selection w  1, cooperators are favored by selection, i.e.,
ρC > 1/N , if and only if Γ > 0 holds in equation (2.8). For multiplayer two-
action games with a general payoff matrix of the kind displayed in figure 3.1,


















(g − i)di − g2d0
)]
. (3.3)
In order to compare the fixation probabilities of the two types, equation (2.9)
is deployed. It implies, that the condition for the fixation probability of coop-
erators to be greater than the one of defectors is that Φ is positive, i.e.,
The fixation probability of a cooperator exceeds the one of a defector, i.e.,
ρC > ρD, if and only if Φ > 0 holds in equation (2.9). For Φ, Gokhale and






(ci − di) + d0 − cg−1. (3.4)
3.2. Results for a threshold public goods game
In this section, a threshold public goods game is applied to the model. The
threshold is denoted by k and represents the number of cooperators needed
for the provision of a public good b, that is then shared equally among the g
players. The payoff for a cooperator is given by
ci =
{
c˜ if i < k − 1,
b
g − c if i ≥ k − 1,
(3.5)
where i is the number of other cooperators in the group, that is, additionally to
the focal cooperator. For variable c˜, a distinction between two cases is made:
Either unconditional expression of the cooperative trait holds, i.e., a cooperator
pays a cost although the group fails to produce the public good (hence c˜ = c),
or conditional expression holds, i.e., a cooperator only pays a cost when the
public good is effectively produced (hence c˜ = 0).
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The payoff for a focal defector reads as
di =
{
0 if i < k,
b
g if i ≥ k,
(3.6)
where i is the number of cooperators among the players.
In the following, the conditions for ρC > 1/N and ρC > ρD are reformulated in
terms of the benefit-to-cost ratio after applying these payoffs to Γ and Φ.
3.2.1. Comparison to the neutral case














g − k + 1
g




It follows that Γ is always negative for
k ≥ 2(N − g)(g + 1)
2N − g . (3.8)
If 2N > g2 − 2g, inequality (3.8) never holds, because k ≤ g holds by design of
the game.
Assuming that the threshold k is smaller than the right hand side of inequality
(3.8), the condition Γ > 0 can be reformulated in terms of the benefit-to-cost
ratio, i.e., in the case of unconditional expression, cooperation is favored by




g2(g + 1)(N − 1)
2N(g + 1) + k(g − 2N)− 2g(g + 1) . (3.9)













N(g − k + 1)− 2g2 − 2g + gk)] . (3.10)
Under the assumption that
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Figure 3.2.: Critical benefit-to-cost ratio for fixed population size N = 40 and
fixed number of required cooperators k = 3
k <
(N − 2g)(g + 1)
N − g (3.11)
holds, which is always fulfilled if N > g2−2g, the condition for selection favoring




g(N(g − k + 1)(g − k + 2)− g(g + 1) + k(k − 1))
N(g − k + 1)− 2g(g + 1) + gk . (3.12)
The critical benefit-to-cost ratio (b/c)∗ is given by the right hand side of (3.9)
and (3.12), respectively. Its dependence on the parameters reflect how the
stringency of the conditions depends on the parameters.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for varying group size g
when population size N and threshold k are fixed and indicates an increase of
the critical ratio with increasing slope.
Figure 3.3 presents the critical benefit-to-cost ratio depending on N for fixed
g and k. The critical ratio decreases monotonically and approaches its lower





2(g + 1)− 2k (3.13)
for c˜ = −c, and
(b/c)∗∞ = lim
N→∞
(b/c)∗ = g(g − k + 2) (3.14)
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Figure 3.3.: Critical benefit-to-cost ratio for fixed group size g = 10 and fixed
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Figure 3.4.: Critical benefit-to-cost ratio for fixed population size N = 40 and
fixed group size g = 10
for c˜ = 0.
Figure 3.4 shows the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for varying threshold k and
indicates that for c˜ = −c, the critical ratio increases monotonically in k, and
for c˜ = 0, it is a non-monotonic function of k.
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3.2.2. Comparison of the two types
Applying payoffs (3.5) with c˜ = −c and (3.6) to Φ given by (3.4) and rearranging
leads to
Φ = −c(N − 1) + bN − g
g2
. (3.15)
For g = N , this expression is always negative, meaning that a cooperator’s
fixation probability is always smaller than a defector’s fixation probability. For
g = k, ..., N − 1, the condition ρC > ρD reformulated in terms of the benefit-





1− g/N . (3.16)
Using c˜ = 0 when applying payoffs (3.5) and (3.6) to Φ, yields






For g = N , this expression is never positive, implying that a cooperator’s
fixation probability is never larger than the fixation probability of a defector.





1− g/N . (3.18)
In both cases (c˜ = −c and c˜ = 0), the respective critical benefit-to-cost ratio,
given by the right hand side of inequality (3.16) and (3.18), respectively, is
monotonically increasing in d and monotonically decreasing in N . In the limit
N →∞, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches its lower bound
(b/c)∗∞ = lim
N→∞
(b/c)∗ = g2 (3.19)
for c˜ = −c, and
(b/c)∗∞ = lim
N→∞
(b/c)∗ = g(g − k + 1) (3.20)
for c˜ = 0.
Interestingly, the critical ratio does not depend on the threshold k when c˜ = −c,
and decreases linearly in k when c˜ = 0.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for a fixed population size
N and increasing group size g. It indicates monotonic increase with increasing
slope.
Figure 3.6 shows the critical benefit-to-cost ratio decreasing for an increased
population size and approaching its lower bound g2 and g(g−k+1), respectively.
16






























Figure 3.5.: Critical benefit-to-cost ratio for fixed population size N = 40 and





























Figure 3.6.: Critical benefit-to-cost ratio for fixed group size g = 10 and fixed
number of required cooperators k = 3 with limits for N →∞
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3.2.3. Stationary distribution
The stationary distributions were calculated as (2.10) using R (R Core Team,
2016).
Figure 3.7 illustrates the stationary distribution for varying group sizes g as
well as varying population sizes N and for a fixed benefit-to-cost ratio b/c as
well as fixed threshold k.
Smaller group sizes promote higher abundance of cooperators, whereby larger
population sizes seem to reinforce this effect.
18
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Figure 3.7.: Stationary distributions of the Moran process for parameters




This chapter adapts the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma (introduced for infinite
populations by Pen˜a et al. (2016)) to finite populations.
Same as for the volunteer’s dilemma described in chapter 3, the model considers
a finite well-mixed population of size N consisting of cooperators and defectors.
The dynamics of the population is governed by the frequency-dependent Moran
process. Within selected groups, individuals play games that determine the
fitness of the types which in turn influences the transition probabilities of the
Moran process.
The waiting-for-volunteers dilemma differs from the volunteer’s dilemma in the
way how groups of players are formed. Recall that in the volunteer’s dilemma,
group size is assumed to be constant and groups are hence formed via hyper-
geometric sampling.
4.1. Group formation via negative hypergeometric
sampling
The waiting-for-volunteers dilemma assumes that a successful interaction re-
quires a certain number of individuals that cooperate. Therefore, groups of
players are formed by sequentially drawing random individuals from the popu-
lation until a certain number k of cooperators is reached.
Depending on the current state of the process, one of the following two situations
can occur: Either the process is in a state where less than k cooperators live in
the population (m < k ≤ N), or the process is in a state where the population
hosts at least k cooperators (k ≤ m ≤ N).
In the first case, all the individuals are sampled from the population, because
the stop criterion, to have k cooperators in the group, is never fulfilled.
In the second case, individuals are sampled until there are k cooperators among
them. Then, sampling is stopped and the selected group engages in a game.
Each time such a group of players is formed, there can be a different number
of defectors involved.
Let Y (m) denote a random variable with corresponding state space Ω(m) =
{0, ..., N −m} that describes the number of defectors in the group. Its distri-
bution is a negative hypergeometric, meaning that the probability to have j
defectors participating in the game is given by
21
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Number of participating defectors 0 1 ... j ... N − k
cooperator c0 c1 ... cj ... cN−k
defector d0 d1 ... dj ... dN−k
Figure 4.1.: Payoff matrix for an evolutionary game in which the payoff depends
on the number of defectors among the players











This probability mass function is explained as follows.
Imagine that m cooperators and N−m defectors are first lined up in a sequence





different possible orders for the sequence.
The probability to have j defectors in the group is the same as the probability
to sample the kth cooperator in the (j + k)th draw, or, in other words, the
probability that the kth cooperator is at place number j + k in the sequence.
The therefor suitable arrangements have k− 1 cooperators in the first j+ k− 1





possibilities, and m − k cooperators in the
last N − j − k places, for which there are (N−k−jm−k ) possibilities. Combining
these two requirements ensures that the (j + k)th place is occupied by the kth
cooperator. Hence, the number of suitable arrangements is given by the product
of the two binomial coefficients, and the probability by the frequency of suitable
orders.
4.2. Results for general multiplayer games
Once the group formation process is completed, group members engage in an
interaction with each other where individuals of the same type receive the same
payoff, i.e., the game is symmetric.
In the case m < k ≤ N , every cooperator of the population obtains a payoff c˜
and every defector a payoff d˜.
In the case k ≤ m ≤ N , the number of defectors in a focal group varies. The
assumption that payoffs depend on the number of participating defectors, yields
a payoff matrix presented in figure 4.1.
Individuals that do not participate in the game obtain a payoff of zero.
4.2.1. Expected payoffs
The fitness of each type is determined by the expected payoff that an individ-
ual of the type receives from the game. Therefore, the expected payoffs for
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cooperators and defectors are derived in the following.
In the case m < k ≤ N , all the individuals are sampled for playing, hence, the
expected payoff is equal to c˜ and d˜, respectively:
piC = c˜ and piD = d˜. (4.2)
On the other hand, if k ≤ m ≤ N , an individual obtains a payoff only if it is
sampled for playing, otherwise it gets a payoff of zero.
A cooperator receives the payoff cj when it is chosen to play the game and when
there are j defectors chosen to play as well. This case occurs with probability
P (A ∩ {Y (m) = j}), where A denotes the event that the focal cooperator is
sampled as a player. The expected payoff for a cooperator is the sum over all




P (A ∩ {Y (m) = j}) cj . (4.3)
Applying Bayes’ rule for conditional probabilities yields
P (A ∩ {Y (m) = j}) = P (A|Y (m) = j)P (Y (m) = j). (4.4)
The probability that the focal cooperator is among the sampled players is in-
dependent of the number of defectors sampled, i.e., P (A|Y (m) = j) = P (A),
because during each group formation process, k out of the m cooperators are
randomly selected with the same probability, hence P (A) = k/m.






P (Y (m) = j) cj . (4.5)
Similarly, a defector obtains the payoff dj , if it is selected for playing and if there
are j defectors (including itself) sampled as players. The probability of this
event is P (B ∩ {Y (m) = j}), where B denotes the event that the focal defector
is among the players. The expected payoff for a defector is obtained by summing








P (B|Y (m) = j)P (Y (m) = j) dj , (4.6)
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whereby Bayes’ rule is used again. The conditional probability, that a defector
is chosen to play, when j out of N −m defectors are chosen to play, is simply







jP (Y (m) = j) dj . (4.7)
4.2.2. Comparison to the neutral case
In the case of weak selection w  1, cooperators are favored by selection, i.e.
ρC > 1/N , if and only if Γ > 0 holds in equation (2.8). Hence, an expression of
Γ for multiplayer games with a general payoff matrix of the kind displayed in
figure 4.1 is derived in the following.






























(piC − piD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ2
(4.8)
In the first term, the difference of the expected payoffs simply reads as piC−piD =
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kcN−j − kcN−j − (N − j)dN−j
]
, (4.13)
where the last step follows because the expression in square brackets is zero for
m = N and j = N .
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In each component (i.e. U1, U2 and U3), the term summing overm can be rewrit-
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which occurs in U2 as well as in U3. By drawing out common factors of the sum-
mands and rearranging, the quotient of binomial coefficients can be expressed





















































where the last step follows because j − k ≤ N − k holds, and for m > j − k it




= 0 holds for m > j − k.





























N − j + k + 1
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. (4.19)
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k(N + 1)(N − j)
(N − j + k + 1)(N − j + k) . (4.24)
Thus, equation (4.15) reduces to






N − j + k −
k2(N + 1)
(N − j + k + 1)(N − j + k)
]
cN−j
− k(N + 1)(N − j)







N − k(N + 1)
j + k + 1
)
cj − (N + 1)j




so that the following expression for Γ in (2.8) is obtained:











N − k(N + 1)
j + k + 1
)
cj − (N + 1)j




Cooperation is favored by selection if and only if Γ > 0.
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4.2.3. Comparison of the two types
In order to compare the fixation probabilities of the two types, equation (2.9)
is deployed. It implies, that the condition for the fixation probability of coop-
erators to be greater than the one of defectors is that Φ is positive, i.e.,
ρC > ρD ⇔ Φ > 0. (4.27)
In the following, an expression of Φ for multiplayer games with a general payoff
matrix of the kind displayed in figure 4.1 is derived.









(piC − piD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ2
. (4.28)





(c˜− d˜) = (c˜− d˜)(k − 1). (4.29)









































































































Now the term V1 can be manipulated in a way analogous to the calculations in
section 4.2.2. After changing the order of summation (see (4.14)), the term is
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k!(N − j − 1)!
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N − j + k
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. (4.33)
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k!(N − j − 1)!
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N − j + kdN−j . (4.35)
Replacing these two expressions into equation (4.31) yields














(cj − dj). (4.36)
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Inserting the expressions for V1 and V2 found in (4.36) and (4.37) back into
equation (4.30) results in





(cj − dj) + c0 N − k
N
, (4.38)
so that, in conclusion, Φ reduces to





(cj − dj) + c0 N − k
N
(4.39)
The fixation probability of a cooperator is greater than the fixation probability
of a defector if and only if Φ > 0.
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4.3. Results for a public goods game
In this section, a public goods game is applied to the model.
A number k of cooperators are required to produce a public good, at a personal
cost c. The public good provides a benefit of value b, which is shared equally
among all players in the group, although defectors do not contribute anything.










Depending on whether unconditional or conditional expression of the coopera-
tor’s contribution is assumed, variable c˜ takes on the values c or 0, respectively.
4.3.1. Comparison to the neutral case
After replacing (4.40) into equation (4.26), the condition for ρC > 1/N can be
reformulated in terms of the benefit-to-cost ratio b/c.
First, unconditional expression of the cooperative trait, i.e., c˜ = −c, is assumed.
Replacing the payoffs introduced in (4.40) into equation (4.26) and rearranging
yields
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The expressions for α and β can be simplified to

















−N + k − 1, (4.43)
so that the condition for the fixation probability of a single cooperator being














 > 0. (4.44)
For the special case k = N , the left hand side of (4.44) reduces to (c/2)N(1−N),
a non-positive term for all N ≥ 1, which implies that the cooperators’ strategy
is never favored by selection.
However, for all 1 ≤ k < N it holds that β > 0 (see A.1). Thus, the condition
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While the β stays unchanged in comparison to equation (4.41), α is altered to






For k = N , it follows that Γ = 0, yielding fixation probabilities equal to the
neutral case. For 1 ≤ k < N , the condition for the fixation probability of a
single cooperator to be greater than 1/N can be rewritten as
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the dependence of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio on the
number of required cooperators k when the population size N is fixed. For the
two cases considered, c˜ = −c and c˜ = 0, an increase of the critical ratio with
increasing slope can be observed when k is increased.
Figure 4.3 shows the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for varying population size N
and fixed number of required cooperators k. For the case c˜ = 0, a monotonic
increase with decreasing slope in the critical ratio can be observed. For c˜ = −c,
however, the ratio first decreases until it reaches a minimum, and then increases
with decreasing slope. In both cases, the critical ratio goes to infinity in the
limit N →∞, making the condition impossible to fulfill.
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Figure 4.3.: Critical benefit-to-cost ratio for fixed number of required coopera-
tors k = 3
4.3.2. Comparison of the two types
Replacing the payoffs (4.40) with c˜ = −c into the expression (4.39) of Φ and
rearranging yields
Φ = −c















For k = N follows Φ = −c(N − 1) < 0 and hence ρC < ρD for all N > 1. It
holds that β > 0 for all 1 ≤ k < N . Thus the condition for ρC > ρD can be














Under the assumption of conditional expression (c˜ = 0), the expression for Φ
becomes
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+ b N − k
kN
. (4.51)














Figure 4.4 illustrates the behavior of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio under the
influence of the number of required cooperators when the population size is
fixed. Qualitatively, the same behavior as in section 4.3.1 can be observed: In
both cases, c˜ = −c and c˜ = 0, the critical ratio increases monotonically with
increasing slope in k.
A qualitative similarity with the results for the condition ρC > 1/N also shows
when the number of required cooperators is fixed and the dependence on the
population size is analyzed. This is presented in figure 4.5: For c˜ = −c, there
is an initial decrease to a global minimum followed by increase with decreas-
ing slope, whereas for c˜ = 0, the critical ratio increases monotonically with
decreasing slope.
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Figure 4.5.: Critical benefit-to-cost ratio for fixed number of required coopera-
tors k = 3
4.3.3. Minimal critical benefit-to-cost ratio
For both conditions considered, it was observed that, for a fixed k, there is an
N 6= k + 1 such that the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is minimal. On the left
hand side of figure 4.6 this critical population size N∗ is plotted as a function
of k, and on the right hand side the corresponding minimal benefit-to-cost ratio
is plotted as a function of k.
For both conditions, the left figure shows an almost linear connection between
k and the minimizing population size N∗. For increasing k, the minimal critical
benefit-to-cost ratio increases with increasing slope.
4.3.4. Stationary distribution
The stationary distributions again were calculated as (2.10) using R (R Core
Team, 2016).
Figure 4.7 presents the resulting probabilities for varying number of required
cooperators k as well as varying population size N and fixed benefit-to-cost
ratio b/c.
The larger the number of required cooperators, the less likely are high abun-
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Figure 4.6.: Optimal population size and corresponding minimal critical benefit-
to-cost ratio
dances of cooperators and the more likely are low abundances of cooperators.
Larger population sizes seem to flatten the distributions shifting more proba-
bility mass to intermediate states.
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Figure 4.7.: Stationary distributions of the Moran process for parameters
w = 0.1, µ = 0.01 and b/c = 50
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5. Discussion and outlook
This thesis introduces a model for studying the evolution of cooperation among
unrelated individuals in finite well-mixed populations.
It is aimed at describing natural systems in which a good is created and shared
by a group of individuals, whereby the group is formed by sequential recruitment
of individuals until the number of cooperators required to produce the good is
reached. Then, the good is collectively privatized, hindering further individuals
outside the group from receiving a share. As a consequence, only defectors
that join the group early enough succeed to free ride on the cooperators’ effort,
whereby this number of successful defectors varies each time a group is formed.
The results from analyzing the evolutionary consequences of this mechanism are
discussed below. To finalize, an outline of possible future projects is presented.
Summary of results
In order to determine the potential of cooperators to invade a population of
defectors, the following two question are addressed:
(i) When does natural selection favor cooperation?
(ii) When is the fixation of a cooperator in a population of defectors more
likely than the fixation of a defector in a population of cooperators?
Both questions are answered by deriving conditions that depend on general
payoffs determined by the number of defectors participating in the so far un-
specified game.
In a next step, a public goods game is applied, allowing for rewriting the condi-
tions in terms of the benefit-to-cost ratio of the game. This yields critical values
of the ratio that need to be exceeded in order to have cooperators being favored
by selection or in order to have a cooperator’s fixation probability being larger
than the one of a defector. These critical values depend on the population size
and on the number of cooperators required for the provision of the collective
good.
Critical benefit-to-cost ratios are also derived for the volunteer’s dilemma of
finite populations by using the conditions derived by Gokhale and Traulsen
(2010) and applying a threshold public goods game. In this model, the critical
ratios depend on the population size, the group size and, mostly, as well on the
threshold, i.e., the number of cooperators needed to produce the public good.
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Increasing the number of required cooperators in the waiting-for-volunteers
dilemma leads to more stringent conditions for the success of cooperators by
raising the critical benefit-to-cost ratios. The same holds for increasing the
group size in the volunteer’s dilemma, and for increasing its threshold when the
first question is addressed. When, however, the second question is addressed, a
higher threshold decreases the critical ratio and therefore supports cooperators
in case of conditional expression of the cooperative trait. In case of uncondi-
tional expression, the threshold exerts no effect on the critical value. Notably,
when addressing the first question, the threshold in the volunteer’s dilemma is
subject to additional restrictions, which makes the conditions harder to fulfill.
A striking qualitative difference between the two models is observed when in-
vestigating the influence of the population size on the critical ratios. In the
waiting-for-volunteers dilemma, a larger population size impedes the prevailing
of cooperators, whereas in the volunteer’s dilemma, a larger population size
promotes their invasion by reducing the critical benefit-to-cost ratios down to
certain lower bounds in the limit of an infinitely large population.
Interestingly, the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma exhibits an optimal popula-
tion size in the sense that, for a given number of required cooperators, it min-
imizes the critical benefit-to-cost ratio. Albeit, this is observed in case of un-
conditional expression only.
The findings are in accord with observations concerning the stationary dis-
tributions: an increasing number of required cooperators in the waiting-for-
volunteers dilemma and an increasing group size in the volunteer’s dilemma
reduce the likelihood of states with high abundances of cooperators. Further-
more, in the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma, an increasing population size flat-
tens the distribution making intermediate states more probable, whereas in the
volunteer’s dilemma, an increasing population size promotes high abundance of
cooperators for small group sizes.
Comparing the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma of finite populations to the one
of infinite populations (Pen˜a et al., 2016), the following similarity shows. In
the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma of infinite populations, the conditions for
cooperation to be favored become more stringent as the number of cooperators
needed to provide the collective good increases. This finding is qualitatively
in accord with the results from the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma of finite
populations, as described above.
Outlook
This thesis explores the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma in finite populations
by analyzing the fixation probabilities and the stationary distributions. Other
quantities suitable to characterize the evolutionary dynamics, are fixation times,
i.e., the average times it takes to reach fixation starting from certain states of
the process (Traulsen and Hauert, 2009). Calculating the fixation times and
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exploring how they depend on the population size and the number of required
cooperators would be of interest. Furthermore, comparing the results to the
ones obtained when investigating fixation times in the volunteer’s dilemma,
might uncover further qualitative differences between the two models.
In addition, future work could establish a model that combines the group
formation processes of the volunteer’s dilemma and the waiting-for-volunteers
dilemma in the sense that sampling of group members is stopped once a pre-
defined number of cooperators or a predefined maximal group size is reached,
whichever occurs first.
Another possibility for future work addresses the integration of the waiting-for-
volunteers dilemma of finite populations into infinite populations in the follow-
ing way. Considering an infinite population, groups of finite size are formed
according to binomial sampling. Each group represents a finite population to
which one round of the waiting-for-volunteers dilemma is applied. The cor-
responding expected payoff serves as the payoff obtained by the group in the
infinite population. The dynamics in the infinite population can then be mod-
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Thus, since (ak)1≤k<N is a monotonically decreasing sequence with a positive
last element, it holds that ak > 0 for all 1 ≤ k < N .
A.2. R code
A.2.1. Stationary distribution for volunteer’s dilemma
1 f s t a tD i s t r <− f unc t i on (N, g , k ,w,mu, bene f i t , c o s t ) {
2 # input parameters :
3 # N = populat ion s i z e
4 # g = group s i z e
5 # k = number o f coope ra to r s r equ i r ed f o r p r ov i s i on o f pub l i c good
6 # w = in t e n s i t y o f s e l e c t i o n
7 # mu = mutation ra t e
8 # ben e f i t = value o f pub l i c good
9 # cos t = per sona l co s t f o r product ion o f pub l i c good
10
11
12 # den s i t i e s o f number o f opposing coope ra to r s
13 # f o c a l cooperator
14 P H c <− f unc t i on ( i ,m) { i f (m==0){ re turn (0 ) }
15 e l s e { re turn ( dhyper ( i ,m−1,N−m, g−1) ) }}
16 # f o c a l d e f e c t o r
17 P H d <− f unc t i on ( i ,m) { i f (m==N) { re turn (0 ) }
18 e l s e { re turn ( dhyper ( i ,m,N−m−1,g−1) ) }}
19
20 # payo f f s
21 c pay <− c ( rep(−cost , k−2+1) , rep ( b en e f i t /g−cost , g−(k−2+1)) )
22 d pay <− c ( rep (0 , k−1+1) , rep ( b en e f i t /g , g−(k−1+1)) )
23
24 # expected payo f f s
25 expPayC <− f unc t i on (m) {sum( un l i s t (
26 sapply ( seq (0 , g−1) ,P H c ,m=m) ) ∗c pay ) }
27 expPayD <− f unc t i on (m) {sum( un l i s t (
28 sapply ( seq (0 , g−1) ,P H d ,m=m) ) ∗d pay ) }
29
30 # ra t i o o f the exponent i a l f i t n e s s f unc t i on s
31 f i tR a t i o <− f unc t i on (m) {exp (w∗expPayD(m) ) /exp (w∗expPayC(m) ) }
32
33 # t r a n s i t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s
34 probAsc <− f unc t i on (m) {
35 (N−m)/N∗ ( (1−mu) ∗m/(m+(N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) ) +
36 mu∗ (N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) / (m+(N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) ) )
37 }
38 probDesc <− f unc t i on (m) {
39 m/N∗ ( (1−mu) ∗ (N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) / (m+(N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) ) +
40 mu∗m/(m+(N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) ) )
41 }
42
43 # ra t i o o f P(X { t+1}=m+1|X t=m) and P(X { t+1}=m|X t=m+1) :
44 pAsc <− un l i s t ( sapply ( seq (0 ,N−1) , probAsc ) )
45 pDesc <− un l i s t ( sapply ( seq (1 ,N) , probDesc ) )




48 # ca l c u l a t e sum S
49 S <− sum( cumprod ( t ransRat io ) )
50
51 # ca l c u l a t e the s t a t i ona ry d i s t r i b u t i o n
52 s t a tD i s <− cumprod ( t ransRat io ) / (S+1)
53 s t a tD i s <− c (1 / (S+1) , s t a tD i s )
54
55 re turn ( s t a tD i s )
56 }
A.2.2. Stationary distribution for waiting-for-volunteers dilemma
1 f s t a tD i s t r <− f unc t i on (N, k ,w,mu, bene f i t , c o s t ) {
2 # input parameters :
3 # N = populat ion s i z e
4 # k = number o f coope ra to r s r equ i r ed f o r p r ov i s i on o f pub l i c good
5 # w = in t e n s i t y o f s e l e c t i o n
6 # mu = mutation ra t e
7 # ben e f i t = value o f pub l i c good
8 # cos t = per sona l co s t f o r product ion o f pub l i c good
9
10
11 # den s i t i e s o f number o f d e f e c t o r s p lay ing
12 P NH <− f unc t i on (m) {dnhyper ( seq (0 ,N−m)+k ,m,N, k ) }
13 # payo f f s f o r case m >= k
14 c pay <− f unc t i on (m) { b en e f i t / ( seq (0 ,N−m)+k)−co s t }
15 d pay <− f unc t i on (m) {c (0 , b e n e f i t / ( seq (1 ,N−m)+k) ) }
16
17 # expected payo f f s
18 expPayC <− f unc t i on (m) {
19 i f (m >= k) {k/m∗sum(P NH(m) ∗c pay (m) ) }
20 e l s e (0 )
21 }
22 expPayD <− f unc t i on (m) {
23 i f (m >= k && m < N) {1/ (N−m) ∗sum( seq (0 ,N−m) ∗P NH(m) ∗d pay (m) ) }
24 e l s e {0}
25 }
26
27 # ra t i o o f the exponent i a l f i t n e s s f unc t i on s
28 f i tR a t i o <− f unc t i on (m) {exp (w∗expPayD(m) ) /exp (w∗expPayC(m) ) }
29
30 # t r a n s i t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s
31 probAsc <− f unc t i on (m) {
32 (N−m)/N∗ ( (1−mu) ∗m/(m+(N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) ) +
33 mu∗ (N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) / (m+(N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) ) )
34 }
35 probDesc <− f unc t i on (m) {
36 m/N∗ ( (1−mu) ∗ (N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) / (m+(N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) ) +
37 mu∗m/(m+(N−m) ∗ f i tR a t i o (m) ) )
38 }
39
40 # ra t i o o f P(X { t+1}=m+1|X t=m) and P(X { t+1}=m|X t=m+1) :
41 pAsc <− un l i s t ( sapply ( seq (0 ,N−1) , probAsc ) )
42 pDesc <− un l i s t ( sapply ( seq (1 ,N) , probDesc ) )
45
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43 t ransRat io <− pAsc/pDesc
44
45 # ca l c u l a t e sum S
46 S <− sum( cumprod ( t ransRat io ) )
47
48 # ca l c u l a t e the s t a t i ona ry d i s t r i b u t i o n
49 s t a tD i s <− cumprod ( t ransRat io ) / (S+1)
50 s t a tD i s <− c (1 / (S+1) , s t a tD i s )
51




Berryman, A. A., B. Dennis, K. F. Raffa, and N. C. Stenseth (1985). “Evolution
of optimal group attack, with particular reference to bark beetles (coleoptera:
Scolytidae)”. In: Ecology 66.3, pp. 898–903.
Boza, G. and S. Sza´mado´ (2010). “Beneficial laggards: multilevel selection,
cooperative polymorphism and division of labour in threshold public good
games”. In: BMC Evolutionary Biology 10.1, pp. 1–12.
Byers, J. (1989). “Chemical ecology of bark beetles”. In: Experientia 45.3,
pp. 271–283.
Claussen, J. C. and A. Traulsen (2005). “Non-Gaussian fluctuations arising
from finite populations: Exact results for the evolutionary Moran process”.
In: Physical Review E 71. 025101(R).
Dawes, R. M. (1980). “Social Dilemmas”. In: Annual Review of Psychology 31,
pp. 169–193.
Gokhale, C. S. and A. Traulsen (2010). “Evolutionary games in the multiverse”.
In: PNAS 107.
Gokhale, C. S. and A. Traulsen (2014). “Evolutionary Multiplayer Games”. In:
Dynamic Games and Application 4, pp. 468–488.
Graham, R. L., D. E. Knuth, and O. Patashnik (1994). Concrete Mathematics
- A foundation for computer science. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
Inc.
Hofbauer, J. and K. Sigmund (1998). Evolutionary Games and Population Dy-
namics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Isaac, R. M. and J. M. Walker (1988). “Group size effects in public goods pro-
vision: The voluntary contributions mechanism”. In: The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 103.1, pp. 179–199.
Moran, P. A. P. (1958). “Random processes in genetics”. In: Mathematical Pro-
ceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 54.1, pp. 60–71.
47
Bibliography
Nowak, M. A. (2006a). Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the equations of life.
Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Nowak, M. A. (2006b). “Five rules for the evolution of cooperation”. In: Science
314, pp. 1560–1563.
Nowak, M. A., A. Sasaki, C. Taylor, and D. Fudenberg (2004). “Emergence of
cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations”. In: Nature 428,
pp. 646–650.
Pen˜a, J., G. No¨ldeke, and A. Traulsen (2016). Waiting for contributors in a
volunteer’s dilemma. (in preparation).
Powers, S. T. and L. Lehmann (2016). “When is bigger better? The effects of
group size on the evolution of helping behaviours”. In: Biological Reviews.
Queller, D. C., E. Ponte, S. Bozzaro, and J. E. Strassmann (2003). “Single-
gene greenbeard effects in the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum”. In:
Science 299, pp. 105–106.
R Core Team (2016). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Comput-
ing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. url: https:
//www.R-project.org/.
Raffa, K. F. (2001). “Mixed messages across multiple trophic levels: the ecol-
ogy of bark beetle chemical communication systems”. In: Chemoecology 11.2,
pp. 49–65.
Scott, M. P. (1998). “The ecology and behavior of burying beetles”. In: Annual
Review of Entomology 43.1, pp. 595–618.
Szathma´ry, E. and J. Maynard Smith (1995). “The major evolutionary transi-
tions”. In: Nature 374, pp. 227–232.
Traulsen, A. and C. Hauert (2009). “Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics”.
In: Reviews of Nonlinear Dynamics and Complexity, Vol II. Wiley-VCH.
Traulsen, A., N. Shoresh, and M. A. Nowak (2008). “Analytical results for
individual and group selection of any intensity”. In: Bulletin of Mathematical
Biology 70, pp. 1410–1424.
48
Eidesstattliche Erkla¨rung
Hiermit versichere ich an Eides statt, die vorliegende Arbeit selbststa¨ndig und
nur unter Benutzung der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt zu haben.
Lu¨beck, den 18. September 2016

Danksagung
Ich bedanke mich herzlich bei Herrn Prof. Dr. Arne Traulsen fu¨r die U¨berlas-
sung des Themas, die freundliche Aufnahme am Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Evo-
lutionsbiologie in Plo¨n und die gute Betreuung.
Herrn Prof. Dr. Karsten Keller danke ich fu¨r die Bereitschaft, das Zweitgutachten
zu u¨bernehmen.
Außerdem danke ich Herrn Dr. Jorge Pen˜a fu¨r die tatkra¨ftige Unterstu¨tzung
bei der Umsetzung des Projektes.
Weiterhin mo¨chte ich mich bei allen Mitgliedern der Abteilung Evolutionstheo-
rie des MPI Plo¨n fu¨r die freundliche Atmospha¨re und die interessanten Einblicke
in das Arbeitsleben von Wissenschaftlern bedanken.
